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t in 40% of the cases, resulting in a of aircraft separation. Therefore, the lerting system was not achieved due No single causal factor of the low conformance rate in this experiment was isolated. Pilot reaction time alone did not show a strong effect. Pilots who did not follow the vertical TCAS maneuver turned horizontally away from the intruding aircraft significantly more often than those who followed the vertical TCAS maneuver, which may suggest that the pilots, by executing a turn, felt a vertical maneuver was no longer required; this effect, however, was not present in all instances of nonconformance. Pilots also conformed significantly less often when shown more informative traffic displays, suggesting that pilots, given a more explicit MIC picture, may have felt confident in selecting a different avoidance maneuver; this perception may have been erroneous, however, as these displays had a corresponding higher rate of loss of aircraft separation.
Other possible factors for the low conformance rate were also investigated. Examining the simulated aircraft trajectories for approaches where the pilots were not shown any TCAS alerts or maneuver guidance, the pilots' reactions satisfied what the TCAS would have commanded in only 25% of the approaches, suggesting that the TCAS maneuver is not what the pilots would do instinctively. Further analysis suggested that these problems may stem from the pilots' use of a different and less effective alerting algorithm for deciding when to generate alerts and for selecting an avoidance maneuver.
SIMULATOR STUDY OF ALERTING CRITERIA AND AVOIDANCE MANEUVERS
PREFERRED BY SUBJECTS To examine the underlying causes of pilot nonconformance, a simulator experiment was conducted with the objective of examining subjects' mental 'alert generation logic', used to assess when an avoidance maneuver is necessary and what the avoidance maneuver should be. A variety of displays were tested, to study the effect of displays on subjects' alerting decisions.
The experiment runs each consisted of three parts:
The Flight The subjects were told they were flying an approach, and should press a red button as soon as they thought the other aircraft was blundering towards them, as evidenced by the traffic display. The Maneuver Selection Once the subject indicated the parallel approach traffic was deviating towards them, the traffic display was blanked and six possible maneuvers were graphically shown to the subjects. The subjects were asked to select the maneuver considered best for maintaining inter-aircraft separation. Numerical Simulation The simulator then predicted the miss distance resulting from the selected avoidance maneuvers, providing a first order measurement of the subjects' decision making. The simulator used a Silicon Graphics Indigo 2 workstation for the displays and aircraft dynamics computations. The aircraft dynamics used point-mass calculations with performance constraints representative of air transport aircraft.
In total, nineteen subjects flew the experiment. The characteristics of the subjects varied widely. Subject workload was also varied to test its effect on subject's decisions. The subjects were told their primary task was to keep their wings level despite turbulence, using a side-stick. The turbulence was set to two different levels, generating two different levels of workload. The subjects were not briefed on these qualities.
Four scenarios were flown, in random order, within each test block.
These scenarios were designed to represent a variety of collision trajectories, with high and low convergence rates. One of the four was not hazardous; in another scenario, the 'other' aircraft never varied from its approach path. The complete test matrix was three dimensional, with five displays, four types of scenarios and two workload levels being varied. Most subjects had 40 experiment runs, fully combining all types of displays, workload levels and scenarios, allowing for within-subject comparisons; four subjects did not have runs with the smooth predictor display. The scenarios were flown in blocks of four; each included all runs for each displayworkload combination. The currently operational collision avoidance system, TCAS 11, uses convergence rate to estimate time remaining to collision as a basis for generating an alert. The subjects' reactions, however, did not occur at a consistent time to point of closest approach at their reactions, as shown in Figure 1 . The time to point of closest approach ranged from -13.39 seconds (the subject reacted after the point of closest approach) to 34.32 seconds, with a mean of 14.37 seconds. The wide spread suggests the subjects did not consider convergence rate, differing from the alerting criteria used by TCAS.
The subjects' reactions were instead consistent with a 'Non-Transgression Zone' criteria, based on lateral separation (the cross-track distance between the aircraft). The distribution of the lateral separation between the aircraft at the time of the reaction is shown in Figure 2 . A Chi-Squared goodness-of-fit test found its distribution approximates a normal distribution (p > 99%). The mean lateral separation at the time of the reaction is 1346 feet, with a standard deviation of 345 feet. These statistics were similar for both high and low convergence rate scenarios. For comparison, in the high convergence rate blunders, the aircraft lateral separation could decrease 200 feet between every one second update of traffic information. Therefore, the variance of this distribution is comparable to that expected from a standard deviation of 1.75 seconds in reaction time around an alerting criteria based purely on lateral separation.
Although the newer displays were purposefully designed to give indications of relative convergence rate and trend before an abnormal lateral position was reached by the intruder, no significant differences can be found in the method used by the subjects to generate alerts with the displays showing rate and trend information.
The largest determinant of predicted collision avoidance performance was the convergence rate of the intruding aircraft. In scenarios with a high convergence rate, subject's reactions were too late for an effective avoidance maneuver in 42% of the cases, highlighting the need for use of a more effective alerting strategy. Figure 4 . This criteria is consistent with subjects' reactions in previous experiments. MIT Criteria Display: Added a graphic indication of the alert criteria used by the prototype MIT alerting logic to the baseline display, as shown in Figure 5 . The shape of this alert criteria changes with each update of information about the other aircraft, making it a potentially distracting feature. Three different automatic alerting conditions were used in the experiment:
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No automatic alerts were given to the subjects. Automatic alerts based on an NTZ criteria were given. This underlying criteria was the same as that shown explicitly on the NTZ Alert Criteria display. Automatic alerts based on the MIT prototype alerting logic were given. This underlying criteria was the same as that shown explicitly on the MIT Alert Criteria display. Four scenarios were flown, in random order, within each test block. These scenarios were designed to test a variety of conditions. Half of the time, the NTZ criteria would generate a false alarm or trigger before the MIT criteria; in the other half of the cases the MIT criteria would trigger before the NTZ criteria.
The test matrix for this experiment was three dimensional, testing all combinations of displays, alerts and traffic conflict scenarios. Altogether, subjects completed 36 experiment runs, allowing for withinsubject comparisons. The scenarios were flown in 9 blocks of four, where each block included all the runs for each particular display-workload combination. Pairedcomparison statistical tests were used to analyze differences between conditions.
In some of the conditions created by the various combinations of displays and automatic alerts, alert criteria were explicitly displayed to the pilot which supported the timing of automatically generated alerts, creating consonance between the display and the alerting system. In other conditions, the explicitly displayed alert criteria contradicted the timing of the automatically generated alerts, creating dissonance. Baseline conditions with no automatic alerts andor no display of alert criteria were also tested in this test matrix.
When automatic alerts were not given, the subject's reactions appeared to be strongly correlated with criteria shown explicitly on the display, as measured by the time difference between the subjects' reactions and when each of the alert criteria would have triggered. The mean values of these differences are shown in Figure 6 . The average difference between the subject's response time and the time the NTZ criteria triggered is significantly different when the NTZ criteria is shown compared to when the baseline display is shown (p < 0.01). A similar effect is found for the MIT alert criteria, with a statistically significant difference between subject's reactions with the baseline display available and with the display of the MIT criteria (p < 0.05).
Combined display and automatic alert effects were also found. In general, consonance between the criteria on the Figure 7 . Responses to automatic alerts based on the MIT criteria were the quickest when the MIT criteria was explicitly 'shown on the display. In contrast, subjects' reactions varied the most from the time of the MIT criteria based automatic alerts when the dissonant NTZ criteria was explicitly displayed. However, because subjects' reactions to automatic alerts based on the MIT criteria were variable, statistical significance of these trends can not be proven. Subjects' reactions were significantly closer to automatic alerts based on the NTZ criteria when either alert criteria was explicitly shown on the traffic display. The mean difference in time between the subjects' reactions and the time of m b a s e d automatic alerts drops significantly from the runs with the baseline display (p < 0.01 & p < 0.05, respectively).
Several statistically significant effects were noted between cases with no automatic alerts and with each of the types of alerts. These effects correlate with subjects' The automatic alerts may have been used as additional input to the subjects' reasoning. The automatic alerts may have served as a cue for the subjects to evaluate the situation. The automatic alerts may have given the subjects greater trust in their reactions when they coincided. This results provide insight into the relative effects of automatic alerts and the explicit display of alert criteria, and highlight the importance of consonance between the displays and the automatic alerts. Practical considerations for the task of closely spaced parallel approaches require further study, however. Although benefits were found with the display of the MIT criteria, it did not completely meet the ultimate objective of enabling the subjects to consistently use strategies good enough to ensure collision avoidance. In addition, the display of the MIT criteria --or a similar criteria --may not be the final or best display to provide to pilots. PILOT CONFORMANCE TO AUTOMATICALLY GENERATED COMMANDS The e results raise broader issues about pilot intera tion with executive alerting systems. Alerting syste s with executive roles are designed with the comm nds quickly and precisely. In cases of nonconfo ance, pilots are instead electing to examine the situati k n, and execute a resolution to the hazard which may hot resemble that commanded.
Their actions effectikely change the role of the alerting system and of implic / t assumption that pilots will execute the commands, it is unknown whether they are need to confirm the alerting ay involve several factors, t may be concemed that the alerting system to act as it should.
system will generate an el compelled to assess the make their own decisions about a resolution to the hazard, or they may execute a more severe version of the commanded resolution.
The second type of alerting system failure occurs when the alerting system generates unnecessary or ovcrly conservative commands. When the alerting system is designed to prevent catastrophic events, variance in the sensor measurements and unpredictability in the system dynamics requires its reasoning to be conservative. While a conservative design helps ensure prompt, adequate reactions to dangerous situations, it also increases the frequency of false alarms and excessive commands from the alerting system. Although the alerting system is performing to specifications, false alarms may appear to the pilot as failures of the system. For most tasks, the resultant cost of this type of alerting system failure is comparatively low in any single event. However, this type of failure can have indirect, cumulative effects. First, they may degrade the pilots' trust in all information presented by the alerting system by making the alerting system's functioning appear spurious and unreasonable. Second, past experience with these failures reduces pilot confidence that a future alert or command is not also a second type failure.
The second factor in pilots' desire to confirm alerting system commands is a perception that, while the alerting system is functioning to its specifications, these specifications do not include a11 relevant information or have the same objectives as the pilots. For example, pilots indicated in a survey that they sometimes do not follow TCAS commands --or turn them off --in conditions where they visual contact with the other aircraft or have knowledge of the other aircraft's intentions through ATC communications. [2] The third factor in pilots' desire to confirm an alerting system's commands is the relative confidence they place in the alerting system compared to their own decisions. When pilots have a high confidence in their own reasoning and a low confidence in the alerting system's reasoning, they are more likely to act upon their own reasoning and to confirm automatic commands. With a higher relative confidence in the alerting system, pilots will feel less of a need for confirmation of automatic commands. However, when pilots place equal confidence in the alerting system and their own reasoning, whether this confidence is high or low, the pilots' final actions can not predicted. These relative confidence levels may change over time as pilots become more familiar with the alerting task and with the alerting system.
A lack of confidence in the alerting system may change the pilots' behaviour from that expected. First, they may attempt to confirm its alerts and commands. This confirmation process alone can cause a delay in the pilots' responses. If the pilots' assessments do not agree with the alerting system's commands, they may additionally execute different resolutions to the hazard. These experiment results illustrate how pilots' strategies may vary from the increasingly sophisticated logic being developed for alerting systems. A resulting mismatch between pilot decisions and alerting system commands may contribute to non-conformance.
Implementation of an executive alerting system is typically expected to increase system performance at some metric, such as an increased ability to resolve traffic conflicts, while eliminating the need for pilots to perform the alerting and decision-making sub-tasks.
When pilots instead confirm the alerting system's alerts and decisions, they are effectively changing the role of the alerting system. In doing so, the anticipated benefits of the alerting system may not be fully realized.
First, by giving an executive role to the alerting system, it is expected that the pilots will be relieved of responsibility for the alerting task. However, nonconformance to the alerting system's commands implies that the pilots are still executing some or all of the components of the alerting task. If the alerting system presents sufficient supporting information to make verifying its commands easy, then this workload may be small. However, if the alerting system's commands are difficult to understand, the reconciliation and decisionmaking tasks may be intensive or the pilots may choose to ignore the alerting system entirely.
In addition, if the pilot does not follow the alerting system immediately andfor does not execute its commands, the resultant system behavior can no longer be described by the pre-determined functioning of the alerting system and the performance of the system can be affected. Unlike the logic underlying the alerting system, the algorithms pilots will use to formulate their own decisions and to reconcile their decisions with the alerting system's commands can not be predicted with certainty. Involvement of pilots in the decision making removes the ability to analyze the system behavior with the same degree of certainty. This variability may limit the extent to which the performance of the combined pilot-alerting system can be predicted during design and certification.
METHODS OF ENCOURAGING PILOT
CONFORMANCE In cases where pilot non-conformance may have detrimental effects, two possible methods of promoting pilot conformance can be envisioned. First, the alerting system's commands may be made mandatory for the pilots to follow. Although this method promotes pilot conformance, it also raises several issues. In reducing the role of the pilot to an un-informed control actuator, the anticipated benefits of having a pilot in the loop are lost, and the pilots reactions will be slower. This role of the alerting system may also have difficulty being accepted. Finally, blocking off all relevant information may be impractical; pilots may use information from other sources as a basis for non-conformance.
The second method encourages informed decisions by the pilots by incorporating consonance between the pilot's displays and the alerting system's commands. In situations where the alerting system's commands are valid, this method promotes pilot conformance, while maintaining the benefits of a pilot in the loop in situations where pilots have better reasoning. As such, this method has two design objectives:
To reduce mismatches between the pilots' decisions and the alerting system's commands, explicitly present the synthesized information implicit in the alerting system's algorithms. To make the task of reconciling the pilots' decisions and alerting system commands easier, explicitly present the alerting thresholds and decision-making objectives used by the alerting system's algorithms. For example, the hazard assessment and alerting function implicitly contains intermediate steps. Given the current state of the system, the future behavior is predicted and the hazard level is calculated --synthesized information. This synthesized information is then evaluated to determine the need for an alert; this determination is performed in alerting systems by comparisons to predetermined alert thresholds.
The results of the preliminary study described in this paper suggest positive benefits may be found towards encouraging informed pilot conformance by generating consonance between the pilot's displays and the underlying logic of the alerting system used to generate automatic alerts and commands. However, displayalerting system consonance requires that the underlying logic of the alerting system be communicable in a quickly understood form. Alerting systems are being proposed for operations which are very complex, require very specific types of performance, or involve many operators. In these situations, an alerting system may be required to reach the desired specifications, but rigorously encouraging pilot conformance through display consonance may not be possible because of the complexity of the alerting system's functionality. Such cases may represent a limit on the use of alerting systems, and on the types of operations which require these sophisticated alerting systems to extend the human pilot's abilities.
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